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Introduction 
The Cocks IBE Scheme was first proposed by Clifford Cocks in 2001 at the 8th 
IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding. It is a cryptosystem that 
allows identity-based encryption (IBE) and is based on the difficultY of the composite 
quadratic residue problem, which has to do with when a number is a square modulo a 
positive integer n. [3] An identity-based encryption scheme is a type of public-key 
cryptosystem where the public key is some unique infonnation about the identity of the 
user (e.g. a user's email address or important dates in his/her life). [5] 
This cryptosystem depends on the sender and receiver knowing solutions to 
public quadratic equations modulo a large composite number M, where M is the product 
of two very large primes,-P and Q. Both P and Q are usually 600-700 digits, making M 
extremely large, and factorization of M nearly impossible. This, in part, makes the Cocks 
IBE Scheme a very secure system, and it can be shown, as is proved later in this paper, 
that being able to crack the scheme would be equivalent to solving the composite 
quadratic residue problem, which is currently unsolved. 
Section 1: Basic Conce ts in Number Theor · 
A major component ofunderstancling the Cocks ffiE scheme is the Law of 
Quadratic Reciprocity. Topics from number theory needed in order to understand and 
prove this theorem include: modular arithmetic, linear congruences, quadratic residues, 
Euler's Criterion, the Legendre symbol, theorems for calculating the Legendre symbol, 
the Jacobi symbol, and Gauss's Lemma. 
Modular arithmetic will be the main form of arithmetic used in this paper. In 
particular, we will be using linear congruences very often and looking at when two 
integers are congruent to each other. 
Definition 1.1: If a, bE Z and nE N, we say that a is congruent to b modulo n if nl(a·b), 
and write a = b(mod n). [1, pg. 22] 
For all theorems and definitions from this point on, we will assume that a is an integer 
and p is an odd prime. 
Theorem 1.1: Let p, q be distinct primes. If pia and qla and gcd(p, q) = 1, then pqla. 
Proof: Since pia and qla, then a= p · k and a= q ·l for some integers q, I. Then, 
p • k = q · l. Therefore, plql. By theorem, if gcd(p, q) = 1 and plql, then pll. We 
know that gcd(p, q) = 1 since p and q are distinct primes; thus, we can conclude that pll. 
Then l = p · m for some integer m. Therefore, a = p · k = q · l = q · p · m = pqm. 
Thus, a= pqm, and therefore pqla. • 
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Definition 1.2: An integer a is a quadratic residue modulo an odd prime p if: 
1) x2 = a( mod p) has an integer solutionx, and 
2) gcd (a,p)=1 [1, pg. 115] 
For example, 2 is a quadratic residue, or square mod 7. To see this, we need to solve the 
congruence x 2 = 2 (mod 7). Note that gcd(2,7) = 1. We can easily see that both x = 3 
and x = 4 are solutions, since 32 = 9 = 2 (mod 7) and 42 = 16 = 2(mod 7). The 
following theorem introduces a simpler way to check whether a is a quadratic residue 
modulop. 
Theorem 1.2-Euler's Criterion: The integer a is a quadratic residue modulo an odd 
primep if and only if a~ = 1 (modp). [1, pg. 116] 
To prove this theorem, we first need to remind ourselves of several definitions and 
theorems. 
Defmition 1.3: Let n e N. If h is the smallest positive integer such that a" = 
1 (mod n), we say that his the order of a modulo n. [1, pg. 93] 
Theorem 1.3: Let m e N. If a has order h modulo m, and ar = 1 (mod m), then hjr. 
Proof: By Euclid's division lemma, there exist k, s e Z such that r = kh + s {0 S s < 
h). Hence, 1 = ar = akh+s = (a")kas = 1 kas = a5 (mod m). Thus s = 0, since his 
the least positive exponent such that a"= 1 (mod m) and s ~ 0. Therefore, hjr. • 
[1, pg. 94] 
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Definition 1.4: Let m e N. The function </J(m) shall denote the number of positive 
integers less than m that are relatively prime tom. This function </J(m) is called the Euler 
</J-function. [1, pg. 54] 
Definition 1.5: Let m E N. If g has order </J(m) modulo m, then g is called a primitive 
root modulo m. [1, pg. 94] 
Theorem 1.4.1: If gis a primitive root, then g1,g2, • .. ,g cf>(m) arc all distinct and thus 
inlcude all elements modulo m relatively prime to m. That is, g is a generator mod m. 
Theorem 1.4.2: Let m E N. Then m has primitive roots if and only if m is 2 or 4 or a 
number of the form p« or 2p«, where p denotes an odd prime. [1, pg. 97] 
Theorem 1.5 (l'ermat'slittle Theorem): Ifp is a prime and gcd(n, p) = 1, then 
nP-1 = 1 (mod p). [1, pg. 62] 
Now we have the necessary means to prove Euler's Criterion. 
Proof of Euler's Criterion: Suppose that a is a quadratic residue modulo p. Let X be any 
integer s~ that 
X2 = a (mod p). 
Since gcd(p, a) = 1, then gcd(X2, a) = 1, and thus gcd(X, p) = 1. Consequently, 
p-1 p-1 
a 2 :: (X2) 2 :: XP-1 :: 1 (mod p), 
by Fermat's Little Theorem. 
On the other hand, suppose that 
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p-1 
a 2 = 1 (modp) 
Let g be a primitive root modulo p. Since g is a primitive root, then g generates 
everything in the group z;, which includes every integer that is relatively prime top, and 
there exists some power, r, of g, such that 
gr =a (mod p), 
!.=.! p-1 (Dr) 2 = a z = 1 (mod p) 
Since g is a primitive root, it has order p - 1. But, from Theorem 1.3, we see that 
(p- 1)1 (r(p- 1)/2. Thus, r /2 must be an integer; that is, r = 2s, where sis an integer. 
Hence, ifx = g 5 , then 
x2 = g2s = gr =a (modp); 
this establishes Euler's Criterion. • [1, pg. 116] 
This proof leads us to a useful corollary. 
Corollary 1.1: Let g be a primitive root modulo p, and assume gcd(a, p) = 1. Let r be 
any integer such that gr =a (mod p). Then r is even if and only if a is a quadratic 
residue modulo p [1, pg. 116] 
PROOF: Assuming that a is a quadratic residue modulo p, we can see that r is even from 
the proofofEuler's criterion. Conversely, ifwe assume that r is even, then r = 2s, and 
thus gr = g 25 = (95) 2 = a (mod p). Therefore, a is a square, or quadratic residue 
modulop. 
Now we can look at an example of Euler's Criterion. Let a = 2, p = 5. Then 
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&-1 
22 = 21 = 4 ~ 1 (mod 5). Therefore, by Euler's Criterion, 2 is not a quadratic residue 
modulo 5. We can confirm this by looking at all the elements of Z5 and checking 
whether they square to 2. We note that 02 = 0 = 0 (mod 5), 12 = 1 = 1 (mod 5), 22 = 
4 = 4 (mod 5), 32 = 9 = 4 (mod 5), 42 = 16 = 1 (mod 5). Therefore, none of the 
elements square to be congruent to 2 modulo 5, and thus, 2 is not a quadratic residue 
modulo 5. 
We shall now define the Legendre Symbol, as well as the Jacobi Symbol, both of 
which greatly simplify calculations in problems on quadratic residues, and are needed in 
order to prove the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity. 
Definition 1.6: The Legendre Symbol is defined as: 
{
1 if a is a quadratic residue modulo p {~) = 0 ifpla 
., -1 otherwise 
[1, pg. 116] 
By this definition, using the same example from above, we can see that (~)= 1 since 2 is a 
quadiatic residue mod 7. We can see that (i)=O since 316 and thus, 6 is not a quadratic 
residue mod 3. Also, as previously mentioned, 2 is not a quadratic residue modulo 5 and 
5t2; therefore (D = -1. 
Theorem 1.6: If p is an odd prime and a and b are relatively prime top, then 
{;) = (;),if a = b(mod p) (1.6.1) 
(1.6.2) 
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E=.! ( ) az =; (modp) (1.6.3) 
[1, pg. 117] 
Proof: Statement (1.6.1) follows directly from the definition or(;). 
Statement (1.6.2) follows from Corollary 1.1. First, let a= gr (mod p) and b ~ 
g8 (mod p). Then ab = gr g 8 = gr+s (mod p). There are three different cases for the 
possible values of(;) and (;) and we will look at each one separately. 
Case 1: Let both (;) and (;) equall. Then {;) ~) = 1. Also, both a and b are 
quadratic residues modulo p, and thus by Corollary 1.1, both r and s are even. Therefore, 
r +sis even, and thus, ab, which is congruent to gr+s (mod p), is a quadratic residue 
modulo p and (~) = 1. Therefore, (;) ~) = (~). 
Case 2: Let(;)= 1 and(;)= -1. Then(;)(;)= -1. Also, a is a quadratic residue, 
whereas b is not, and thus by Corollary 1.1, r is even and s is odd. Therefore, r + s is 
odd, and thus, ab, which is congruent to gr+s (mod p), is not a quadratic residue modulo 
p by Corollary 1.1 and(~)= -1. Therefore,(;)(;)= (~). Similarly, we can see 
that if(;) = -1 and ~) = 1, then the same proof would hold and we would also have 
Case 3: Let both(;) and~) equal-1. Then(;)(;)= 1. Also, both a and bare not 
quadratic residues modulo p, and thus by Corollary 1.1, both rands are odd. Therefore, 
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r + s is even, and thus, ab, which is congruent to gr+s (mod p) is a quadratic residue 
modulo p by Corollary 1.1 and{~) = 1. Therefore, {;) {;) = {~). 
Therefore, {;) {;) = { ~) for all possible values of{;) and {;). 
As for (1.6.3), we see that if a is a quadratic residue modulo p, then Euler's Criterion 
implies that 
!=! {a) a 2 = 1 = p (mod p ). 
Since 
aP-1 = 1 (mod p) 
by Euler's Criterion, then raising both sides of the congruence to a power of;. we can see 
that 
~ 
a---r = ±1 (mod p), 
since p ~ a. Thus, if gcd(a, p) = 1 and a is not a quadratic residue modulo p, then, by 
Euler's Criterion, we see that 
!!::!: (4) a z = -1 = ; (mod p ). • [1, pp. 117-118] 
Deftnitlon 1. 7: If n is any integer, then the least residue of n modulo m, where m is a 
positive integer, is the integer x in the interval {-~,~]such that n = x (mod m). We 
denote the least residue of n modulo m by LR.'"(n). [1, pg. 119] 
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For example, the set { -5, -4, -3, -2, -1,0,1,2,3,4,5} is a complete set ofleast residues 
modulo 11. ThusLRu(21)= -1, since 21 = -1(mod 11); similarly,LRu(99)= 0, and 
LRu(60)= 5. 
For p an odd prime, the complete set of least residues mod p is 
{ 
p-1 p-3 p-1} 
--
2
-, ", 1 -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ",,-
2
-,-
2
-
Theorem 1.7- Gauss's Lemma: Let gcd(m, p) = 1 where pis an odd prime and mE Z, 
and let J.1. be the number of integers in the set 
{m.2m, ... ,; (p -l)m} 
whose least residues modulo p are negative. Then (;) = ( -1)1i, [1, pg. 119] 
Before proving this theorem, we must first define the signum of x and state the 
cancellation law. 
Definition 1.8: We define sgn(x) (read signum ofx), where xis a real number, by 
{
+1 ifx > 0, 
sgn(x) = 0 ifx = 0 
-1 ifx < 0 
In general, we note that x = lxl sgn(x). [1, pg. 119] 
Theorem 1.8- Cancellation Law: Forb, d, d' E Z and c E z+, if bd::: bd'(mod c) and 
ifgcd(b, c)= 1, then d = d'(mod c). 
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Proof: Since (bd - bd')/c is an integer, clb(d- d') . Thus, since c and bare relatively 
prime, cl(d- d'), that is, d = d'(mod c). • 
We give the proof from Andrews' text. [1, pp. 119-120] 
Proof of Gauss's Lemma: First note that none of the integers m, 2m, ... , i (p - l)m is 
divisible by p since gcd(m, p) = 1. Now, for any integer n, 
nm = LR,(nm) = sgn(LR,(nm)) jLRp(nm)!(modp). 
We also know that the value ILRp(nm)l is distinct for different n values. That is, for 
integers~. n2, ILR,(~m)! :1: jLR,(n2m)j. There are two cases where jLRp(lltm)j = 
jLR,(n2m)j: 
Case1: If~m = n 2m (modp), where gcd(m,p) = 1, then n 1 = n 2 (modp) by Theorem 
1.8. 
Case 2: lf71tm = -n2m (modp), where gcd(m,p) = 1, then 7lt = -n2 (modp) by 
I p-1 Theorem 1.8. Therefore,~+ n 2 = 0 (modp). Thus, p {n1 + n 2). But 0 < n1 S - 2-
and 0 < n 2 S ";
1
, thus 0 < 7lt + n 2 S p -1, but this contradicts the fact that p/(n1 + 
Therefore, jLRp(nm)j is distinct for different n values. 
Since 0 < ILRp(nm)l < p/2, we sec that as n takes all integral values in the interval 
(0, p/2), so does jLRp(nm)!. Consequently, 
m(2m)(3m) .. . ( (p -1) ;) = sgn (LRp(m)) sgn(LRp(2m) ... sgn ( LRp ( (p -1) ;) ) 
X [ILR,(m)l ·ILRp(2m)j . . . jLRp ( (p- 1) ;)j (mod p) ], 
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or 
(~(p -1))! m71 = sgn (LRp(m)) sgn(LRp(2m) 
... sgn ( LRp (i (p- 1)m)) (i (p -1)) I (mod p). (1.7.1) 
Since (i (p- 1))! is relatively prime top, we may cancel it from both sides of(1.7.1). 
Hence, 
m~ = sgn ( LRp(m)) sgn(LRp(2m) ... sgn ( LRp G· (p -l)m)) (modp). 
!.:.! ( ) But m z = ; (mod p), by Theorem (1.6.3), and 
{-l)ll = sgn (LRp(m)) sgn(LRp(2m) ... sgn (LRp (i(p -1)m)). 
Thus, 
(;) = (-1)1l (mod p) 
Since each of the congruence equals either +1 or -1, and sincep> 2, 
[1, pp. 119-120] 
We can extend the definition of the symbol (~) to include the case where m is any odd 
number: 
Definition 1.9: If m = PtP2 ... Pr where the P1 are odd primes (not necessarily distinct), 
then the Jacobi Symbol(:). nE N, is defined as 
(~ = (~) (~) ... (;). [1, pg. 118] 
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It is useful to note that (:) = 1 does not imply that n is a square, or quadratic residue, 
mod m like (;) = 1 does, where p is an odd prime. This is because (:) is the product of 
many Legendre Symbols that take on the value 1, -1, or 0 depending on the conditions 
explained in Definition 1.6. 
For example, (i) = 1 but 5 is not a quadratic residue mod 6. That is, there is no x 
such that x2 = 5 (mod 6). To see this, we can look at all the elements in Z6 and see if 
any of them square to 5: 
12 = 1 = 1 (mod 6) 
22 = 4 = 4 (mod 6) 
32 = 9 = 3 (mod 6) 
42 = 16 = 4 (mod 6) 
52 = 25 = 1 (mod 6), 
Therefore, none of elements square to 5, and thus 5 is not a quadratic residue mod 6. 
1.1 The Law of uadratic Reciprocity 
The Law of Quadratic Reciprocity enables us to solve almost all quadratic 
congruences involving a prime modulus. It is by no means an easy theorem; great 
mathematicians such as L. Euler and A. Legendre were perplexed by it. It shows the 
measure of greatness of C.F. Gauss that he proved it when he was only nineteen years 
old. Since this theorem is of fundamental importance in number theory, Gauss returned 
to study it several tiri:tes throughout his life, and he gave at least six different proofs. [1, 
pg. 118] We will give one of these proofs in detail in the next section. 
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Theorem 1.9- Law of Quadratic Reciprodry (LOR >: if p and q are distinct odd primes, 
then (;)- {!) unless p = q = 3(mod 4), in which case {;) = -(;). 
REMARKS: This theorem may be stated equivalently in the form 
~) (*) = (-1)(p-1)(q-1)/4 
[1, pg. 116] 
Also, this theorem generalizes to the case where p and q are only distinct positive odd 
integers, not necessarily prime [4, pg. 28]. 
For example, pick two distinct primes, 5 and 11. By the LQ.R, since 
S = 1 (mod 4) and 11 = 3 (mod 4), then (1
5
1) = C51). One of the primes can be 
= 3(mod 4); they just cannot both be. To check this, we can compute the values of 
( 1
5
1) and (~1 ). To compute the value of (:1), we check to see if 5 is a quadratic residue 
modulo 11. This involves solving the equation x 2 = S (mod 11). It is simple to see that 
x = 4 is a solution since 42=16= S(mod 11). Therefore, (:1) = 1 using the Legendre 
Symbol. Similarly, we check to see if 11 is a quadratic residue modulo 5. We solve the 
equation x 2 = ll(mod S) or x 2 = l(mod S) since 11 = 1(mod 5). We can see that 
x = 1 is a solution since 12= 1 = 1(mod 5). Thus {~1) = 1 by the definition of the 
Legendre Symbol, and thus (:J = Cs1). 
Theorem 1.10: If p is an odd prime, then 
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( 1) !=!. ~ = (-1) a (1.10.1) 
(2) 6 ; = (-1) z (1.10.2) 
(!) = { 1 ifp = 1 or 11 (mod 12) P -1ifp = Sor7(mod12) (1.10.3) 
[1, pp. 123-124] 
Proof: By Gauss's Lemma, with m = -1, we see that p. = i (p- 1) since 
-11 -21 .. • 1 - i (p- 1) all have negative least residues; this establishes (1.10.1.). 
With m = 21 p. is the number of integers in the set {214, ... 1 p - 1} whose least 
residues modulo p are negative, which is the same as the number of even integers in the 
interval e';1 , p - 1]. Since positive residues take on values between 0 and 11; 1, then any 
number greater than p;l must have a negative residue. There are 11; 1 elements in the set 
{2,4, ... 1 p - 1}. The value P;1 can either be even or odd, depending on the value of p. If 
11
;
1 is even, then the set {2,4, ... , p - 1} can be split in the two sets { 2, 4, ... , P;1} and 
{P;3, ... , p - 1 }, with the former having positive least residues, and the latter having 
negative least residues. The set { 2, 41 ... , P;1} has P:1 elements, thus, the set 
{p+3 } (p-1 p-1) p-1 . { J - 2-, ... 1 p - 1 has - 2--4 elements. If 2 1s odd, then the set 2,4, ... 1 p - 1 
can be split into the two sets { 2, 4, "' 1 p;3} and e;1 1 o o o 1 p - 1 }. with the former having 
positive least residues, and the latter having negative least residues. The set { 2, 41 ... , P;3} 
p-3 {p+l } (p-1 p-3) has 4 elements, thus, the set - 2-, ... , p - 1 has - 2--4 elements. 
We will now look at possible values of p and what p. equals for these values. 
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C 1 L 8 1 f1 . ' Th p-1 85+1- 1 4 hi h . ase : et p = s + or some mteger s. en - 2- = - 2- = st w c 1s even. 
Therefore, the number of elements in the set of negative least residues is 
p-1 p-1 as+1-1 
-----= 2 4 2 
as+1-1 
4 
= 4s-2s = 2s. 
. p-1 8s+3-1 8s+2 . Case 2: Let p = as+ 3 for some mteger s. Then - 2- = - 2- = - 2- = 4s + 1t which 
is odd. Therefore, the number of elements in the set of negative least residues is 
p - 1 p - 3 as + 3 - 1 as+3-3 
4 -----= 2 4 2 
8s+2 
= 2 
as 
4 
= 4s + 1 - 2s = 2s + 1. 
C 3 L a 5 f1 ' Th p-1 8s+S-1 Bs+4 4 2 hi h ase : etp = s + orsomemtegers. en-2- = - 2- = - 2- = s + , w c 
is even. Therefore, the number of elements in the set of negative least residues is 
p-1 p-1 Bs+S-1 
~-~= 2 
as+S-1 
4 
as+4 
=--2 
8s+4 
4 
= 4s + 2 - (2s + 1) = 2s + 1. 
. p-1 8s+7-1 8s+6 . Case 4: Let p = as+ 7 for some mteger s. Then z = -
2
- = -
2
- = 4s + 3, which 
is odd. Therefore, the number of elements in the set of negative least residues is 
p - 1 p - 3 as + 7 - 1 as+ 7-3 
4 -2--~= 2 
as+ 6 
=--
2 
17 
as+4 
4 
Thus, 
= 4s + 3 - (2s + 1) = 2s + 2. 
{
2s 
2s+ 1 
J.L = 2s + 1 
2s+2 
whenp = Bs + 1 
whenp = Bs + 3 
whenp = Bs + 5 
whenp = Bs + 7. 
Hence, J.L is even if and only ifp = ±1 (mod 8). Consequently, 
We can see that 
f!) _ {1 whenp = ±1 (mod B) 
\p - -1 when p = ±3 (mod 8). 
(-1)'z;1 = {1 when p = ±1 (mod 8), 
-1 when p = ±3 (mod 8). 
This is true since p = ±1 (mod 8) means p = ±1 + Bk for some k e Z and thus, 
p2 -1 (±1+8k)2 -1 (-1) 8 = (-1) 8 
1±16k+64k2-1 
= (-1) 8 
±16k+64k2 
= {-1) 8 
= ( -1)±21c+81cz 
The value 2(±k + 4k2) will always yield an even integer and -1 to an even power 
pZ-1 
equals 1. Therefore, (-1)_•_ = (-1)2(±kHkz) = 1 wheneverp = ±1 (mod 8). 
Similarly, p = ±3 (mod B) means p = ±3 + Bk for some k E Z and thus, 
p2-1 (±3+81c)2-1 (-1) 8 = (-1) 8 
8±161c+641c2 
= (-1) 8 
18 
= (-1)1±6k+8k2 
The value 1 ± 2(3k + 4k2) will always yield an odd number and -1 to an odd power 
p2-1 
equals-!. Therefore, (-1) a ={-1)1±2(3k+-'k2) = -1 wheneverp = ±3 (mod 8). 
Therefore, (1.10.2) is established. 
For (1.10.3), we know that 
We also know that 
ifp = 1 (mod 4) 
bytheLQR. 
ifp = 3 (mod 4). 
ifp = 1 (mod 3) 
ifp = 2 (mod 3). 
If we want ~) = 1, then we want p = 1 (mod 3) and p = 1 (mod 4), or p = 2 (mod 3) 
and p = 3 (mod 4). The first two· congruences are equivalent top = 11 (mod 12), and 
the second two are equivalent top = 1 (mod 12). 
If we want ~) = -1, then we want p = 1 (mod 3) and p = 3 (mod 4), or p = 
2 (mod 3) and p = 1 (mod 4). For the first case, the congruence p = 1 (mod 3) 
implies that p = 1, 4, 7, or 10{mod 12). The congruence p = 3 (mod 4) implies that 
p = 3, 7, or 11 (mod 12). Therefore, for both to be true, we need p = 7 (mod 12). 
For the second case, the congruence p = 2 (mod 3) implies that 
p = 2, 5, 8, or 11 (mod 12) and p = 1 (mod 4) implies that p = 1, 5, or 9 (mod 12). 
Therefore, for both of these congruences to be true, we need p = 5 (mod 12). Therefore, 
(3) { 1 ifp = 1 or 11 (mod 12) p = -lifp = 5 or 7 (mod 12). • 
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We can apply Theorem 1.5, as well as the definition ofth.e Legendre Symbol and the 
LQR to the following example: 
Does the congruence x2 = 631 (mod 1093) have any solutions (where 631 and 1093 are 
both prime)? 
In other tenns, this is asking if 631 is a quadratic residue modulo 1093. We start by 
looking at the Legendre Symbol c6: 913). 
(~) = (1093) 1093 631 by the LQR, 1093 = 1 (mod 4) and 631 = 3 (mod 4) 
=(462) 
631 by Theorem 1.6.1, 1093 = 462 (mod 631) 
=(613:) ( 63331) by Theorem 1.6.2, 462 = 14x33 
=(6:J (6;J (6: 1) (6131J by Theorem 1.6.2, 14 = 2x7, 33 = 3x11 
We use Theorem 1.6.2 for (
6
:J. and the LQR for the other Legendre Symbols. Since 3, 
7, and 11 are all congruent to 3 modulo 4, and 631 = 3 (mod 4), as previously 
. ( 7 ) (631) ( 3 ) (631) ( 11 ) . (631) mentioned thenbytheLQR, - =- - - =- - and - =- -. 
' 631 7 ' 631 3 ' . 631 11 
Thus, we have 
(6:1) (6;J (6:J (6~1J = c-1) 611:-~ r- e:1)J l-e:1)J r- e:11)J 
= (-1)199oao [- (;)] [- (i)] [- (
1
:)] by Theorem 1.6.1 
= (1)(-1)(-1)(-1) 
=-1 
It is easy to see that {;) = (i) = 1 since 1 is always a quadratic residue, no matter the 
modulo, because 1 ~1. We can see that (
1
:) = 1 as well, since x = 2 is a solution to the 
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equation x2 = 4 (mod 11). Since (16:9~) =· -1, we can conclude that 631 is not a 
quadratic residue modulo 1093, and thus, the equation x 2 = 631 (mod 1093) does not 
have any solutions. 
1.2 _Proof of the Law of uadratic Reci rocitv 
Law of Quadratic Reciprocity (LQR): If p and q are distinct odd primes, then (~)= (!) 
unless p = q = 3(mod 4), in which case (;) = -(;). [1, pg. 116] 
We will follow the proof from Andrews' text. [1, pp. 121-123] 
Proof: Let J.lt denote the number of integers in the set 
{q,2q, ... ,i(p -1)q} 
with negative least residues modulo p. Let J.t2 denote the number of integers in the set 
{p, 2p, .. ··~ (q- 1)p} 
with negative least residues modulo p. It follows from Gauss's Lemma (since p and q 
must be prime) that(;)= (-1)~1 and{!)= (-1)~'z. Then, since(;)=(!) if and only if 
(;) (!) = 1 we see that (;) = (!) if and only if 
{-1)1'1+1'z = 1. 
Thus, to prove the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity, we must show that Itt + J.t2 is odd if 
and only ifp = q = 3 (mod4). 
From here, we proceed geometrically. We will count in two ways the lattice 
points (that is, points whose coordinates are integers) inside a certain hexagon. The first 
count will show that there are an odd number of lattice points in the hexagon if and only 
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ifp = q = 3 (mod 4). Our second count will show that there arc J.l.t + J.L2 lattice points 
inside the hexagon. The two counts together will show that J.L1 + J.L2 is odd if and only if 
p = q = 3 (mod 4). 
I 
1 : 
~I ~. 2 ,, 
.. . , ' Q, tt) 
Lattice Points in proof of LQR [1, pg. 122] 
In the first quadrant of the xy-plane, we consider the hexagon H with vertices 
ABCDEF that lie on the rectangle AGDJ bounded by the coordinate axes and the lines 
x = p /2 andy = p /2, as shown above. 
EP is defined by 
and BC is defined by 
The line BC has x-intercept (i, 0 ), and EF has y--intercept { 0, i) and both lines are 
parallel to the diagonal AD. 
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The coonlinates of the points (x, y) that lie in the interior of H must. satisfy the 
inequalities 
0 < X < p /2, 0 < y < q /2, 
q 1 q q 
Y < -x +- y > -x - -. p 21 p 2p (1) 
Note that if(m, n) is any lattice point in the interior of H, then so is ('~'; 1 -m, q;1 - n); 
we can verify this by substituting these coonlinates into the four inequalities of ( 1 ). We 
now see that 
fE+l q+l ) (m,n) = \--2--m,-2--n 
if and only ifm = p+l and n = q+1; and P: (e:!:.!., q+l) is a lattice point if and only if 
4 4 4 4 
p = q = 3 (mod 4). Thus the pairing of (m, n) with ('~';1 - m, q;1 - n) shows that the 
number of lattice points in His odd if and only if p = q = 3 (mod 4). 
Now we shall consider the lattice points in H from a different point of view. It is clear 
that there are no lattice points on the diagonal y = !!x. If(m, n) is a lattice point below 
p 
the diagonal, then 
qm q qm 
---<n<-; p 2p p 
that is, 
(2) 
We can see that in this case np has a negative least residue modulo q, namely np-qm. 
Conversely, if np has a negative least residue, then np = k (mod q) and - i < k < 0 for 
some integer k. Therefore, ql(np- k) by definition of congruence. Thus, np- k = qm 
23 
-- --------------------
for some integer m, or np - qm = k. Thus, np - qm is a negative least residue modulo 
q since - i < k < 0, and we have produced an m such that (2) holds. Since - i < np -
qm < 0 then- .!L < n- qm < 0 and qm- .!L < n < qm. Therefore (m n) is in Hand 
' 2p p ' p 2p p ' ' 
since it lies below the diagonal and above the line y = ! x + .!. Thus, since J,L2 is the 
'P 2 
number of integers in the set {p, 2p, ..• , i (q - 1)p} with negative least residues modulo 
q, there are J.Lz lattice points in H below the diagonal AD. 
Shnilarly, we find Ill lattice points in H above the main diagonal. 
We conclude that J.L1 + 1-'2 (the total number of lattice points in H) is odd if and 
only if p = q = 3 (mod 4); thus, the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity is proved. • 
[1, pp. 121-123] 
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Section 2: Crypto&raphy 
Cryptography has been around for millennia. It has always been focused on one 
basic problem, that of providing secret communications. Modem cryptography, in 
particular, is interested in all tasks that involve secret agents, human or otherwise, that 
wish to obtain or share some information while still preserving the secrecy of other 
information. The general goal of cryptography is to construct schemes, called protocols, 
which maintain a desired functionality (privacy requirements, rules, etc.), even when 
faced with malicious attempts to hinder this functionality. Therefore, an important aspect 
of cryptography besides privacy is resilience: one would like privacy to be guaranteed 
even if one is not certain that the other participants are behaving honestly. There are two 
key assumptions underlying most cryptosystems. First, it is assumed that all parties 
involved, including the malicious adversaries, are computationally limited. That is, we 
assume that there is a point at which our encryption would be too difficult to crack. 
Second, it is assumed that the cryptosystems involve difficult functions and are therefore 
unable to be easily cracked. This is important because the point of cryptography is not 
just to have secrets, but to actually be able to use them without giving away information. 
[2, pg. 601] 
Symmetric encryption algorithms like Triple DES and AES use the same key both 
to encrypt and decrypt. When used correctly, these systems can provide virtually 
unbreakable security for the information that they are used to protect. It is difficult, 
however, to securely distribute a symmetric key to both the sender and the recipient of an 
encrypted message. These difficulties, though, do not stop the symmetric encryption 
schemes from being widely used in such technology as ATM machines and checkoutS. 
25 
A TMs and checkouts use symmetric encryption so successfully because they only 
communicate with a single well-known system. Unfortunately, very few businesses are 
this simple; therefore, systems have to become more complex. In more complex systems, 
users each need a different key to be able to communicate securely with other users, or 
else users would be able to decrypt messages that were not intended for them. Having a 
large number of users would also give us a large number of keys that we may need to 
securely update on a regular basis. Public-key cryptography was invented to try to solve 
this symmetric key distribution problem. [5] 
2.1 PubUc Key Cryptography 
In a public-key system, each person gets a pair of keys, one known as the public 
key and the other known as the private key. The two keys are mathematically related so 
that infonnation that is encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the 
corresponding private key and vice versa. Therefore, if the public key is made available 
to everyone but the private key is kept secret, then anyone can encrypt a message to 
someone by using their public key, but only the intended recipient can decrypt the 
message by using their corresponding private key. [5] 
A simple example of public-key cryptography can be seen in the following 
diagram: 
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[8] 
We start with two users, Bob and Alice. If Bob wants to send the message "Hello Alice!"' 
to Alice, he uses Alice's public key to encrypt the message. He then sends the encrypted 
message to Alice and she uses her corresponding private key to decrypt the message. 
The original idea of using public keys assumed that the keys would be easily 
accessible in a public directory of some sort, similar to a universal phone book, but a 
practical implementation of this idea has evaded technologists for nearly 30 years. 
Another problem that makes the use of public-key technology difficult is key recovery. 
Recovery of a private key is often required, for example, when the original recipient of 
the encrypted message is not available, but you still need to decrypt the message. In this 
case, you would need to somehow access the same private key that the recipient of the 
message has, but because private keys are usually randomly generated, the only way to 
do this is to securely archive copies of all of the private keys. This leads to many 
problems, such as significant cost and complexity of ensuring that backups are complete 
and recovery plans are comprehensive, in addition to the cost of the groundwork needed 
to achieve this. [5] 
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A famous example of a public-key encryption scheme is RSA. In the RSA 
scheme, if a user, say Alice, wants to receive messages, she publishes a large composite 
nwnber N, called a public key, which is a product of two large primes P and Q, which are 
part of Alice's private key. If one knows N, then one can encrypt any message, but to 
decrypt it, one would need to know P and Q. Therefore, if factorization of N is difficult, 
then only Alice would be able to decrypt messages. [2, pg. 602] 
2.2 Identity-Based Encryption 
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a form of public-key cryptography that allows 
you to calculate a jrublic key directly from a user's identity, for example, his email 
address. Adi Sbamir first introduced the idea of IBE in 1984, as a way to try to eliminate 
difficulties associated with using a public-key system, such as key recovery. His idea 
was to create a way of calculating a public key from a user's identity, and he described 
such a system in the following way: 
An identity-based scheme resembles an ideal mail system: If you know 
somebody's name and address you can send him messages that only he can read, 
and you can verify the signatures that only he could have produced. It makes the 
cryptographic aspects of the communication almost transparent to the user, and it 
can be used effectively even by laymen who know nothing about keys or 
protoeols. [5] 
The form of identity used to calculate an IBE key depends on the application. For 
encrypting emails, a string that n:presents the e-mail address of the recipient might be a 
good choice, but in other applications, a phone number, a device serial number, or an IP 
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address might be more logical. Essentially, any identity that is globally unique can be 
used. [5] 
The general architecture of any complete IBE scheme is the same. In each case, 
the sender calculates the public key of the recipient and then the recipient has to 
authenticate his/herself to a private key generator (PKG) or server to obtain the 
corresponding private key. Therefore, for Alice to send an encrypted message to Bob, 
she will first calculate Bob's public key and then use this public key to encrypt the 
message. After Bob receives the encrypted message, he then authenticates himself to a 
PKG, which will then securely send the corresponding private key to him. He can then 
use the private key to decrypt the message and view its contents. [5] This general 
architecture is illustrated in the following diagram: 
C --~-.-~----.--.m-:t_ll......,.~ 
Alice [9] 
Since ffiE is a public-key technology, it has all the benefits that other public-key 
technologies have, but it also brings other benefits, since IBE keys are calculated instead 
of being randomly generated. Therefore, there is no requirement for looking up public 
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keys, and thus, one of the big practical difficulties that has been associated with public-
key cryptography is no longer an issue. Also, since we calculate a user's private key 
when he initially requests it, we can easily recalculate it at any other time, giving us built-
in key recovery, which is essential for an encryption scheme to have if it is going to be 
used by businesses. A useful consequence of built-in key recovery is that it is easy to 
integrate message hygiene technologies, which make it feasible to actually scan 
encrypted messages for malicious content like viruses, spam, or phishing attacks. [5] 
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Section 3: Cocks IDE Scheme 
The Cocks ffiE Scheme is a cryptosystcm that allows identity-based encryption 
and is based on the difficulty of the composite quadratic residue problem, which has to do 
with when a number is a square modulo a positive integer n. This system has an 
authority that generates a public modulus M that is universally available. This modulus is 
the product of two primes P and Q, held privately by the authority, where P and Q are 
both congruent to 3 mod 4. Although M is public, P and Q are large primes, so 
factorization of M is very difficult. 
The system also makes use of a universally available secure hash function. Hash 
functions are often called "one-way" functions. That is, if we have x, then it is easy to 
find f(x); however, if we have f(x), it is hard to calculate x. The scheme uses this hash 
function to shorten the user's identity to a smaller, more manageable number. Then, if a 
user, say Alice, wishes to register in order to be able to receive encrypted data, she 
presents her identity (e.g. e-mail address) to the authority. In return, she is given a 
private key with properties described below. If a user Bob wishes to send encrypted data 
to Alice, he will be able to do this knowing only Alice's public identity, e.g. her email 
address, and the universal system parameters, such as M. This eliminates the need for a 
public key directory. [3] 
3.1 Set-up 
When Alice presents her identity to the authority, the hash function is applied to 
the string representing her identity to produce a value a modulo M such that the Jacobi 
symbol ~) is + 1. This is a public process that anyone holding the universal parameters 
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and knowing Alice's identity can replicate. This will typically involve multiple 
applications of the hash function in a systematic way to produce a set of candidate values 
for a, stopping when (i;) = +1. This value of a is fixed for each message. [3] 
It is useful to note that the Jacobi symbol can be calculated without knowledge of 
the factorization of M. For example, if we are trying to calculate the Jacobi symbol G:), 
we know from the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity that 
(
13) (77) {13-1)(77-1) 
- - = (-1) 4 71 1-3 
G~) = c-1/12~76) G~) -1 
= c-1)228 G~) 
=G~) 
= (1~) (133) 
= (133) = e:) = (~) = 1 
We can sec that G~) = G:) since 77 = 12 (mod 13) and C~) = 1 since 4 is a quadratic 
residue modulo 13, since 22 = 4 :: 4 (msd 13). Also, (:3) = e:) = (i) using the Law 
of Quadratic Reciprocity and the fact that 13 = 1 (mod 3). It is then easy to see that 1 is 
a quadratic residue modulo 3 and thus (i) = 1. 
More generally, we can see that this method will work for any (i). We know 
that M will always be odd, since it is the product of two large primes P and Q and all 
primes greater than two are odd. If a is odd, then the above method works in general by 
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the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity. If a is even, then we can split {i) into its odd and 
even parts, using the same steps as above for the odd part, and using Theorems 1.5 and 
1. 9 to calculate the even part. Therefore, we can use the above method to calculate the 
Jacobi symbol using theorems we already know, and without knowledge of the 
factorization of M. 
Therefore, as (:) = {;) (~) = + 1, (;) = (~),and ~) and{~) are both either 
+ 1 or -1. If~) and {~) are both + 1, then a is a square modulo both P and Q, and hence 
is a square modulo M. If ~) and (~) are both -1, then -a is a square modulo P, Q and 
hence M. The latter case comes about because by construction P and Q are both 
congruent to 3 mod 4, and so (~1) = (~1) = -1. [3] We can see this since if P = 3 mod 
4, then P = 3 + 4k for some positive integer k, by the definition of congruence, and thus 
by Theorem 1.1 0, 
(-1) p-1 3+4k-1 2+21c p = (-1) 2 = (-1) 2 = (-1)_2_ = (-1)1+2k 
The value 1 +2k will always yield an odd number and -1 to an odd power equals -1. 
Therefore, (~1) = (-1)1+2k = -1 whenever Pis congruent to 3 mod4. Similarly, 
(-1) . c-1) c-1) ; = -1 whenever Q 1s congruent to 3 mod 4. Therefore, 'P = 0 = -1. 
Thus, if{~) and{~) are both -1, then 
fpa) = (~1) (;) = (-1)(-1) = 1 
and 
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(~a)= (~1) (~) = (-1)(-1) = 1, 
and thus, -a is a quadratic residue modulo both P and Q. 
Therefore either a or -a will be a quadratic residue modulo both P and Q, and therefore 
modulo M. The authority is the only one who can calculate the square root modulo M, 
and he presents such a root to Alice. We shall call this value r. The authority determines 
such a root by calculating 
lii+S-(P+q) 
r =a 8 modM 
Such an r satisfies either r 2 = a (mod M) or r 2 = -a (mod M) depending on which of a 
or -a is a square modulo M [3] 
M+&-(P+Ql 
THEOREM: For r = a 8 (mod M), r 2 = ±a (mod M) whenever M = PxQ, 
where P,Q are both congruent to 3 modulo 4. 
JI+S-(P+Q) 
PROOF: Since r is defined as a 8 mod M, then 
( 
lii+S-(P+Q))2 
r 2 = a 8 modM 
( 
Pq+S-(P+Q))2 
= a· 8 modM 
( 
PQ-P-0 +1+4)2 
= a 8 modM 
( 
f(PQ)+4)2 
= a a modM 
t/!(PQ)+4 
=a .c. modM 
!lS!92 
=a 4 ·amodM 
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( 
PQ-P-9+1+4)2 ( ~)2 
We can see that a • = a • mod M since ti'(PQ) = (P - 1)(Q -
~ 
1) = PQ- P- Q + 1. We now want to show that a .. = ±1 mod M. This is 
. (P-1)(Q-1) 
equivalent to showing that a .. = ±1 mod PQ, since M = PxQ, as previously 
defined, and ti'(PQ) = (P -1)(Q -1). As stated previously, as (i) = +1, (~) = (i)· 
There are two cases here for the values of(~) and(~); either both will equall or both 
will equal -1. 
Cue 1: Let (~) = (i) = 1. Then a is a square or quadratic residue both mod P and mod 
Q. Therefore, by Euler's Criterion, 
P-1 9-1 
a-r = 1 modP and a 2 = 1modQ. 
Then, raising both sides of the first equation to the power 9; 1 and both sides of the 
. th P-1 dtha second equation to e power -
2
-, we fm t 
(P-1)(9-1) 
a • = 1modP 
and 
(P-1)(9-1) 
a • = 1mod Q 
( 
(P-l)CQ-1) ) 
since 1 raised to any power always gives back 1. Therefore, PI a • - 1 and 
( 
(P-1)(Q-1) ) ( (P-1)CQ-1) ) Ql a • -1 . Therefore, by Theorem 1.1, PQI a .. -1 , and thus 
~ 
a .. = +lmodM. 
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Case 2: Let(~) = (~) = -1. Then, as shown above on pg. 31, -a is a square or 
quadratic residue both mod P and mod Q. Thus, similarly to Case 1, 
(P-1)(9-1) (-a) 4 :=1modP 
and 
(P-1)(Q-1) 
(-a) 4 = 1modQ. 
Therefore, 
(P-1)(Q-1) (P-1~-1) (-1) 4 (a) = 1 mod P 
and 
(P-1)(9-1) (P-1)~9-1) (-1) 4 (a) = 1 mod Q. 
Since P = Q = 3 mod 4, then P = 3 + 4k and Q = 3 + 4l for some positive integers k 
- and I by the definition of congruence. Therefore, 
(P-1)(9-1) (3+4k-1)(3+4l-1) (-1) 4 = (-1) 4 
(2+4k) (2+41) 
= (-1) 4 
l 4+8k+8l+16kl i 
= (-1) 4 
= ( -1)1+2(1c+l)+4kl 
The value 1 + 2(k + l) + 4kl will always yield an odd number and -1 to an odd power 
(P-l)(Q-1) 
equals -1. Therefore, (-1) • -(-1)1+2(lc+l)+4kl = -1 whenever P and Q are both 
congruent to 3 mod 4. Therefore, 
(P-1~-1) (P-1)(Q-1) (P-1)(Q-1) (-1) (a) 4 =-(a) 4 = 1 mod P 
and 
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2-ow-o ~-QW-9 W-9~-Q (-1) 4 (a) 4 :-(a) 4 ::1modQ. 
Thus, multiplying both sides of both congruences by -1, we see that 
(P-l)(Q-1) 
a 4 = -1modP 
and 
(P-l)(Q-1) 
a 4 = -1modQ 
( 
(P-1)(Q-1) ) ~ 
PQI a 4 + 1 , and thus a 4 = -1 mod M. 
~ ~ Therefore, a 4 = ±1 mod M. Thus, r2 = a 4 ·a mod M = ±a mod M. • 
In what follows, we will assume without loss of generality that r 2 = a (mod M). 
Users wishing to send encrypted data to Alice who do not know whether she has received 
a root of a or a root of -a will need to double up the amount of keying data they send as 
described later. In general, it is not true that exactly one of a or -a will be squares 
modulo M and this is one of the main reasons we use P and Q both congruent to 3 
modulo 4. [3] 
3.2 Encryption 
Assume we have two users, Alice and Bob. If Bob wants to send an encrypted 
message to Alice, he encrypts the data using symmetric encryption. He then sends to 
Alice each bit of the message in tum as follows: 
Letx be a single bit of the message, coded as +1 or -1. That is, O's are 
converted to -1 's. 
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Bob then chooses a value tat random modulo M, such that the Jacobi symbol 
(;) = x. 
Then he sends s = (t + at-1) (mod M) to Alice. 
Alice can only see the value of s, whereas Bob can see the value of s and how it was 
calculated since he knows t. Both Alice and Bob know the value of a, as it is part of 
Alice's public key. [3] 
3.3 Decryption 
Alice recovers the bit X by computing e::r). This WOrks because 
s + 2r = (t + at-1) + 2r mod M since s = (t + at-1) (mod M), as defined above 
= t + 2r + r 2t-1 mod M since r 2 = a (mod M) 
It ~ 11 that th ] b' bol (s+2r) (t(l+rt-1)2) ( t) ((l+rt-1)2) Th ] b' 1.0 ows e aco 1 sym --;;- = M = 'M M • e aco 1 
Symbol (<1+~-1)2) = 1 since (1 + rt-1) is a square; that is, we can find a solution to the 
(;) = x. [3] 
3.4 Problems 
If Bob does not know whether a or - a is the square for which Alice holds the 
root, then he will have to replicate the encryption steps above, using different randomly 
chosen t values to send the same x bits as before, and transmitting s = (t- at-1 ) (mod 
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M) to Alice at each step. This then doubles the amount of keying data that Bob must 
send. It would be useful if we could find a way to avoid having to send this extra 
information, but at present this is an unsolved problem. [3] 
Computationally, this system is not too expensive. If the transport key is L bits 
long, then Bob's work consists of needing to compute L Jacobi symbols and L divisions 
mod M. Alice's work consists mainly of computing L Jacobi symbols. Depending on the 
implementation and for typical parameter values (e.g. L = 128 and M of size 1024 bits), 
this is likely to be no more work than what is needed for a single exponentiation modulo 
M The main issue regardjng practicality is the bandwidth requirement, since each bit of 
the transport key requires a number of size up to M to be sent. If we have a 128 bit 
transport key, and are using a 1024 bit modulus M, Bob will need to send 16K bytes of 
keying material. If he does not know whether Alice has received the square root of a or 
of -a, then he will have to double this. [2] This much overheac;l may seem impractical for 
encrypting routine business communications, but it is likely less of a concern if we use 
the scheme for exchanging keying material that only needs to be done infrequently. This 
specific feature of the Cocks mE scheme has prevented it from gaining widespread 
acceptance. [5] 
3.5 Security 
Clearly, one way to break the scheme is to factor M. This is a weak link, so 
shared knowledge methods of generating M and the use of multiple authorities will be 
desirable. With this shared generation of M, it is also feasible to generate the exponent 
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M+S-s(P+Q) that is used to compute square roots in a shared fashion, so that no master 
secret ever has to exist in a single location. [3] 
We study the security of this scheme with the assumption that Mhas not been 
factored. We will also assume that Bob has had to double his keying information and 
sends the pair (y~, ,Y2), where y1 = (t1 + at11) (mod M) and y2 = (t2 - at;1) (mod M) 
to Alice. 
3.5.1 Security Proof 
Theorem: Let y1 = (t1 + at;1 ) (mod M) and y2 = (t2 - at;1) (mod M). Given y1 , y2 
provides no information about x = (: ), and vice versa; that is, given y2, y1 provides no 
information about x = {~) [7] 
Proof: Suppose that y = y1• Then y = (t1 + at11) (mod M) and r 2 = a (mod M). 
We also know that y2 = (t2 - at;1) (mod M). Then, multiplying y2 = t2 - at;1 (mod 
M) by tz on both sides and rearranging, we get 
Therefore, 
tl-yzt2 -a= 0 (modM) 
t~- y2 t 2 - a= 0 (mod P) (1) and 
tl- y2tz -a = 0 (mod Q) (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) are quadratic equations modulo a prime; therefore they each have 
exactly two solutions. Let tp1 , tp2 be the roots of equation (1 ), and tq1 , tq2 be the roots of 
equation (2). Therefore, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, there will be four possible 
values of t2 and 
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Therefore, 
since (1) and (3) are congruent to 0 modulo P and (2) and ( 4) are congruent to 0 modulo 
Q. Thus, 
then 
t · t__ = -a (mod P) Pt -pz -
Therefore for tp1 and t,2 , either (~) or {~) equals -1 and the other equals + 1. The 
same is true for tq1 and tq2 • Thus, since tp1 1 t,2 , tq1 1 tq2 are the possible values of t2, 
x = (~) has a ~ possibility of equaling + 1 and a ~ possibility of equaling -1. 
Therefore, we have no infonnation about x because there is an equal likelihood of x 
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equaling + 1 or -1. [3] In order to get this information, we would need to have a 
procedure that can distinguish the two cases of(~) = + 1; that is, we would need to 
determine somehow whether a is a square or -a is a square without factoring M. This is 
the composite quadratic residue problem, which is currently unsolved. [7] 
An attacker would be, in practice, presented with a set of many such terms 
(t + at-1) (mod M) and possibly also (t - at-1) (mod M) for different values oft. 
Therefore, we want values oft that are independent and randomly distributed over the set 
of values with the desired key value. [7] 
3.6 Example 
To better understand the Cocks mE Scheme, we will look at an example with P 
and Q both very small primes. We let P • 11 and Q • 7; therefore, M = P x Q = 77. 
Suppose that Bob wants to send the message "Ill" to Alice. We first convert the message 
to ASCIT and find that Ill= [104, 105]. We then convert these numbers to binary to get 
[1101000, 1101001]. According to the encryption rules of the scheme, we want to have a 
string of 1 'sand -1 's; therefore we convert all O's to -1 's, giving us [(1, 1, -1, 1, -1, -1,-
1), {1, 1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 1)]. To encrypt the entire message, we would then apply the 
encryption steps to each bit of this string. For this example, we will go through the 
encryption and decryption steps just for the first bit. 
To set the scheme up in general, Alice would present her identity and then the 
hash function would be applied to the string representing her identity to produce a value a 
modulo M such that the Jacobi symbol ~) is + 1. For this example, we will simply let a 
be the number of letters in the user's name. Suppose I, Shannon Prager, am the user in 
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this case. Then a = 13 and G~) = +1. We then determine the square root, r, of a, by 
calculating 
M+S-(P+Q) 
r =a 8 modM 
77+S-l11+7) 
= 13 mod 77 
= 138 mod 77 
= 36 mod 77 
Wecanseethat36:z = 1296 = -13mod 77, thereforer2 =-a mod 77,andhence, 
-a is a square modulo 77. 
Now to encrypt the first bit, x = 1, we must choose a random t such that (~) = x. 
We lett= 9 since the Jacobi symbol (7~) = 1. If Bob does not know whether a or -a is 
the square for which I hold the root, then Bob will have to send both s1 = (t + 
at-1) mod M and S:z = (t- at-1 ) mod M to me. Calculating both of these, we find that 
and 
s1 = (9 + 13 · 9-1) mod 77 
= (9 + 13 · 60) mod 77 
= 789mod 77 
= 19mod 77 
s2 = (9 - 13 · 9-1) mod 77 
= (9 - 13 · 60) mod 77 
= -771mod 77 
= 76mod 77 
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It is useful to note that s1 = 19 is the case where a is a square modulo 77, and s2 = 7 6 is 
the case where -a is a root modulo 77. Bob then sends the pair (s1, s2) = (19, 76) to me. 
I receive this pair and compute the Jacobi symbols ('1 ;:r) and e2: 2r): 
e1 ~ 2r) = c 9 +7~ . 36) 
=G~) 
=0¢x 
e2 ~ 2r) = e6 +7~ . 36) 
= e7~8) 
=1=x 
We can see that we do not get backx when computing the Jacobi symbol with s1 . This is 
due to the fact that s1 is for the case where r 2 = a mod 77, but for this example, it was 
shown that we are in the case where r 2 = -a mod 77. Therefore, we get x back when 
computing the Jacobi symbol with s2 since this is the case where r 2 = -a mod 77. 
To encrypt the entire message, Bob would need to go through and encrypt the rest 
of the bits, using a different randomly chosen t value to encrypt each bit. Also, if Bob 
does not know whether a or -a is the square for which I hold the root, then he will have 
to double the amount of keying infonnation he sends, sending both s1 and s2 to me. 
In general, if Bob sends both s1 and s2 , he must note which goes with a being a 
square and which goes with -a being a square. Since Alice knows r and a, she can 
compute r 2 and see if she gets a or -a. 
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Conclusion 
The Cocks IBE Scheme is a very secure cryptosystem. The only public 
parameters of the system are the square a and the modulus M. We have shown that 
knowing any information about the Jacobi symbol (~) would be equivalent to solving 
the composite residue problem, or finding an x such that x2 = a mod M, which is 
currently unsolved. If ~torization of M is known, then x2 = a mod M can be broken up 
into congruences involving P and Q and these can be solved using known theorems. 
However, P and Q are chosen to be very large primes, so factorization of M is extremely 
difficult. 
The main issue regarding the practicality of the Cocks IBE Scheme is the 
bandwidth requirement, since each bit of the transport key requires a number of size up to 
M to be sent. If Bob does not know whether Alice has received the square root of a or of 
-a, then he will have to double the amount of keying data he must send. This specific 
feature of the Cocks IBE Scheme has prevented it from gaining widespread acceptance. 
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